The (not-so-hidden) facts behind Israel’s Gaza invasion

author : Phan Nguyen topic : Israel

by Phan Nguyen

On December 27, 2008, Israel initiated a military invasion of the Gaza Strip that after nine days has left over 500 Palestinians dead and over 2,000 wounded. The attack was named “Operation Cast Lead” in reference to a children’s Hanukkah song.

Once the attack began, a simplified narrative emerged to explain the circumstances:

1. Israel and Hamas in the Gaza Strip had a ceasefire agreement.

2. Hamas irrationally and inexplicably decided to violate the cease-fire by raining rockets on civilian areas in Israel.

3. Israel then retaliated with airstrikes in order to halt stop the firing from Gaza.

This article will dissect this narrative, referring to news articles in the international press just prior to the attack in order to develop a context that reflects the actual chain of events, rather than the simplified narrative that is based on stereotypes, conjecture, misinformation, and propaganda.

The situation in Gaza prior to the ceasefire agreement

In the January 2006 Palestinian elections, the Hamas party won a majority of the seats in the Palestinian Legislative Council, upsetting the previous Fatah majority. Rather than attempt to work with the new majority party in the Palestinian government, the United States, Israel, and other western states, as well as western-friendly Arab states, sought to undermine Hamas’s authority. Eventually, the United States conspired with Fatah through weapons, financing, and training to defeat Hamas militarily. The plan backfired and Hamas defeated Fatah, taking over control of the Gaza Strip in June 2007.

Israel then attempted to undermine Hamas’ authority by tightening its already existing restrictions on the flow of goods into the Gaza Strip, while denying all exports out of the Gaza Strip.

Additionally, several times since then, Israel has instituted a complete closure of the Gaza Strip, preventing Gazan access to food, fuel, and humanitarian supplies. These full closures are ostensibly meant to prevent rocket attacks on Israel from Gaza by Palestinian militant groups. However, because these closures collectively punish the entire population of 1.5 million Gazans by depriving them of food, electricity, clean water, and medical care and have done little to halt rocket attacks, these measures can more accurately be seen as strangling Gaza in order to prevent Hamas from becoming a functional governing authority. Even when Israel’s full blockade is lifted, the movement of goods are kept to a bare minimum.

Origins of the ceasefire

The most recent ceasefire between Israel and Hamas was initiated on June 19, 2008. Under the agreement, which applied only to the Gaza Strip and not to the West Bank, Hamas would halt rocket and mortar attacks. Israel would cease attacks on Gaza and ease its blockade of Gaza. Additionally, since other armed groups in Palestine were firing rockets and mortar shells from Gaza, it was Hamas’ responsibility to rein them in.

Initially there were minor violations on both sides that neither party interpreted as extreme. Israel continued to shoot into Gaza. Meanwhile various other militant groups within Gaza, such as Al-Quds Brigades (belonging to Islamic Jihad) and Al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades, challenged Hamas’ authority by continuing to fire rockets and mortars. However, Hamas was able to clamp down through preventative measures and arrests until rocket firing was nonexistent.

Looking at the chart on page 4, one can clearly see that the ceasefire was initially effective in preventing rocket attacks from Gaza. Although groups other than Hamas still attempted to fire rockets and mortar shells, those numbers drastically decreased from the hundreds to single digits, until by October, the number was reduced to one rocket fired and one mortar fired. Throughout this period, no rocket or mortar caused any deaths. At the same time, Israel responded to each rocket or mortar attack by tightening the Gaza siege, thus preventing the delivery of much-needed supplies to an already deprived population of 1.5 million people.

Who broke the ceasefire?

Since the start of Operation Cast Lead, many reports have blamed Hamas for breaking the ceasefire in late December, either by stating that Hamas began firing rockets at the end of the six-month truce, or else omitting mention of the ceasefire expiration and simply stating that Hamas decided to start firing rockets suddenly. However, nei-ther assertion adequately explains what really happened.

On Nov. 4, with no rockets fired since the single one fired by Al-Quds Brigade on Oct. 21, Israeli troops entered the Gaza Strip to destroy a tunnel that it claimed was to be used for capturing Israeli soldiers. Israeli soldiers occupied at least two Palestinian homes. Hamas fighters arrived, and a gun battle ensued. Eventually seven Hamas members were killed, some Palestinian homes were demolished, and a number of Palestinians from a single family were abducted, including some women.

It was at this point that Palestinians considered the ceasefire broken.

Hamas responded by firing over a hundred rockets and mortar shells in the direction of both Israeli military sites and civilian towns. Other Palestinian militant groups fired projectiles as well. Israel instituted a full border closure.

On Nov. 6, the military wing of Hamas issued a press release, stating that it would not renew the ceasefire after the six-month expiration, unless Israel agreed to “open-ing [border] crossings and lifting the siege” of Gaza.

A few minor gunfights erupted within the next few days, and a small number of rockets were fired.

By Nov. 11, the violence subsided, and no rockets were fired on that day. However, the next day, Israeli troops crossed the border into Gaza and killed four Hamas fight-ers, who were allegedly planting explosives near the border.

Various militant groups, including the armed wing of Hamas, responded with rockets and mortar shelling directed at both Israeli military and civilian locations. The Hamas military wing issued a press statement: “Retaliation options are open, and the ceasefire will not prevent us from retaliating to any Israeli folly.”

Hamas was no longer preventing other armed groups from firing projectiles. Rockets and mortars were being fired from the Gaza Strip in response to Israeli attacks in Gaza, and in response to Israeli attacks and assassinations in the West Bank. As usual, multiple armed groups would claim credit for the same rocket attacks.

From then on, rockets and mortars were being fired almost every day, although at a considerably lower rate than in the months preceding the ceasefire, and causing no fatalities. (Prior to the ceasefire, rocket and mortar attacks from Gaza had killed a total of 16 people in Israel since 2001. Due to the inaccuracy of the weapons, only 0.2% of all the rockets and mortar shells fired into Israel from Gaza have resulted in a fatality) Israel also regularly struck at military targets in the Gaza Strip, killing a number of Palestinians.

Thus, since Israeli troops crossed into Gaza on Nov. 4, the ceasefire had been on shaky ground, and it could be construed as more of a low-level tit-for-tat, rather than any true cessation. Before that, there were no attacks from either side, although Israel’s blockade of Gaza was continuing to strangle the population.

What does Hamas want?

By the time the ceasefire expired, there really was no state of calm to maintain. But what did Hamas hope to attain by escalating its own rocket attacks and allowing other armed groups to fire rockets as well?

According to the public statements of Israeli officials, it’s a mystery. Israeli President Shimon Peres stated, “Nobody in this world understands what are Hamas’ goals and why it continues to fire missiles….This shooting has no point, no logic, and no chance.”

Mark Regev, the spokesperson for Prime Minister Ehud Olmert also publicly expressed befuddlement: “There’s really no logical explanation why Hamas acted the way they did, why they attacked, why they escalated, except maybe...is it not possible there’s something inherently nihilistic in Hamas’s agenda?”

Meanwhile mainstream press has posited a similarly simplistic view. New York Times reporter Stephen Farrell, in a Dec. 29 piece headlined, “Hamas Credo Led It to End Cease-Fire,” claims that Hamas hungers for publicity and “status conveyed on Hamas as the Palestinians’ principal resistance.”

Robert Dreyfuss on the Nation online followed up with a similarly simplistic explanation: “Like Israeli extremists such as Netanyahu, who thrive on conflict, Hamas too seems to have believed that it could revive itself by provoking its giant military adversary.” Such statements sound dramatic, but have little bearing in reality.

The fact is that Hamas was being caged in from several directions. Within the Gaza Strip, it was being strangled and its authority challenged by the closure imposed by Israel, whose intention was to make it impossible for Hamas to administer to the needs of its people. Since November 4, the ceasefire was no longer working as planned, having deteriorated into the low-level tit-for-tat attacks and no significant easing of the blockade. In the West Bank, the Fatah-run Palestinian Authority working under the guidance of Israel and the United States—was clamping down on Hamas, arresting its members. Internationally, world governments, also under US–Israeli influence, were refusing to accept Hamas’s legitimacy or acknowledge Hamas’s position as a ruling power.

Hamas’ foray into governmental rule had been undermined from the start. By December 2008, with the humanitarian crisis in the Gaza Strip worsening and with the ceasefire no longer a true ceasefire, Hamas needed to take action. It basically had two weapons from which to negotiate: It had the power to prevent other militant groups in the Gaza Strip from attacking Israel, and it had the power to attack Israel itself, primarily by launching rockets and mortar shells.

Hamas needed to show that it still had some cards it could play. Its goal was to slightly intensify the situation by showing that it still held some power, in order to get Is-rael to renegotiate a new ceasefire on better terms.

This analysis of Hamas’ position and intentions is neither obscure nor novel. In fact, it was the generally accepted assessment, notwithstanding the feigned befuddlement of Israeli spokespersons. We can look at the record:

Wall Street Journal, Dec. 29: “In recent weeks, Israeli intelligence officials have said they believed Hamas doesn’t want a full-scale confrontation, but rather wants to make a show of force before seeking a renewed cease-fire on more favorable terms.”

And what would those favorable terms be?

Jerusalem Post, Dec. 17: “[Israeli defense] officials predicted that Hamas would eventually agree to an extension of the truce but was ‘posturing itself’ in an attempt to gain a commitment from Israel and Egypt to reopen the crossings into Gaza.”

Ha’aretz, Dec. 22: [Shin Bet security service chief Yuval Diskin at an Israeli cabinet meeting on Dec. 21:] “Make no mistake, Hamas is interested in continuing the truce, but wants to improve its terms. It wants us to lift the siege [of Gaza], stop [IDF] attacks, and extend the truce to include [the West Bank].”

Ha’aretz, Dec. 22: [Shmuel Zakai, former commander of the IDF’s Gaza Division:] “We could have eased the siege over the Gaza Strip, in such a way that the Palestini-ans, Hamas, would understand that holding their fire served their interests. But when you create a tahadiyeh [referring to the ceasefire], and the economic pressure on the Strip continues, it’s obvious that Hamas will try to reach an improved tahadiyeh, and that their way to achieve this, is resumed Qassam [rocket] fire.

Ha’aretz, Dec. 28: “Hamas has clear conditions for its extension [of the ceasefire]: The opening of the border crossings for goods and cessation of IDF attacks in Gaza, as outlined in the original agreement. Later, Hamas wants the cease-fire to be extended to the West Bank.”

And what did Hamas say?

Al-Ahram, Dec. 25-31: “[Quoting Ayman Taha, high-ranking Hamas official:] ‘What kind of truce agreement [is Israel] about when Israel refuses to implement any of the points agreed about lifting the blockade?...We will not allow Israel a ceasefire that it can exploit in order to attack us militarily and tighten the stranglehold on us economi-cally.’ Hamas, says Taha, will agree to a renewal of the truce only if Israel halts all aggressive activities, lifts all forms of the boycott that it has imposed on a million and a half people in Gaza for more than two years, and applies the truce to the occupied West Bank. In addition, he added, the truce will have to be backed by international guarantees since his movement can no longer ‘trust agreements made by Israel.”

Ha’aretz, Dec. 24: “Mahmoud Zahar, one of the Hamas leaders in Gaza, told Israel’s Channel 10 on Monday that the truce could be restored if Israel provides Gazans with regular food supplies and electricity and puts military actions to a halt in the West Bank and Gaza. Zahar also told Egyptian newspaper Al Ahram in an interview pub-lished Tuesday that Israel need only agree to the conditions of the last truce, reached in June, for it to be renewed for another six months.”

Was that asking too much from a ceasefire? Amnesty International didn’t think so. Here’s what Amnesty stated on Nov. 5, after Israel violated the ceasefire: “The cease-fire has brought enormous improvements in the quality of life in Sderot and other Israeli villages near Gaza, where before the ceasefire residents lived in fear of the next Palestinian rocket strike. However, nearby in the Gaza Strip the Israeli blockade remains in place and the population has so far seen few dividends from the ceasefire.”

As noted in Ha’aretz on Dec. 24, “Hamas warnings are looking more and more like a new version of the most popular game in the region: brinkmanship.” And on Jan. 2, “Hamas has already demonstrated rational behavior by alternating its strategies, between restraint and brinkmanship.” Hamas’ recent actions make more sense when judged by the more conventional idea of brinkmanship, rather than dismissed as religious extremist irrationality.

Another indicator that Hamas was seeking brinkmanship is that Hamas attempted to up the ante but decided not to go all the way. Rocket attacks and mortar shelling in-creased by late December, but most of these attacks were committed by groups other than Hamas’ armed wing. Hamas chose to participate in the tit-for-tat attacks, but with some restraint—by not preventing other groups from firing rockets and mortars, while not participating in the attacks as much.

Additionally, the idea that Hamas was seeking a showdown with Israeli ground forces has little weight, notwithstanding Hamas’ penchant for blustery pronouncements. Although Hamas has been able to upgrade its fighting capabilities to some extent during the ceasefire, so far there have been no signs that Hamas has attained the type of military capabilities needed to hold off Israeli ground forces comparable to Hezbollah’s capabilities in 2006. As well, the Israeli military has acknowledged, with reserva-tions, that it has overestimated Hamas’ capabilities to sustain rocket attacks against Israel.

What does Israel want?

Most media have treated Israel’s actions as a direct response to Palestinian rocket and mortar fire from the Gaza Strip, although some have characterized it as a dispropor-tionate response. The reality is that Israel’s invasion of the Gaza Strip is not a direct response to Palestinian firing and is thus neither proportionate nor disproportionate to such a goal.

If Israel was indeed responding to Palestinian rocket and mortar fire, then it would presumably focus its retaliatory attacks on the perpetrators. Several other armed groups in Gaza have been responsible for the rocket and mortar fire, including the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades and the armed wings of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP), and the Popular Resistance Committees (PRC). One of the groups most responsible for at-tacks on Israel during the ceasefire period and immediately afterward is the Palestinian Islamic Jihad.

Yet the primary target of Operation Cast Lead is what can be considered the Hamas infrastructure. The public statements from Israeli officials have almost exclusively focused on Hamas. And this is not limited to the armed wing of Hams. As one senior Israeli military official explained, “There are many aspects of Hamas, and we are trying to hit the whole spectrum, because everything is connected and everything supports terrorism against Israel.” To that end, Israel has intentionally bombed civilian targets such as Gaza’s parliament building, the education and transportation ministries, mosques, a university, and money exchange stores. Israel has also intentionally targeted the civil police force, which is responsible for keeping local order. In one instance, Israel bombed a graduation ceremony for police cadets, killing over 40 civilians. The sole connection to “terrorism” is that the civil police force operates under the government, which is run by Hamas.

Ironically, it was Hamas that prevented other militant groups from firing rockets and mortar shells into Israel during the ceasefire. As the ruling authority in Gaza, it was able to clamp down on these other groups. After Israel’s violation of the ceasefire on Nov. 4, Hamas eased its restrictions, and several groups started firing rockets and mortar shells again.

By destroying the civil infrastructure, Israel is making it more difficult for Hamas to enforce a ceasefire on other armed groups. The reality is that the period in which the people of southern Israel enjoyed the most calm was during the ceasefire.

At this point however, Israel has indicated no interest in a ceasefire, preferring instead to pursue its true goal: to destroy Hamas’ authority over the Gaza Strip, a goal that it had previously attempted by pitting Fatah against Hamas, and also by strangling the population of the Gaza Strip by imposing a blockade.

A greatly expanded version of this article will appear on the Works in Progress website at www.olywip.org.